Israel's extensive destruction of Southern Lebanon

News - 26 August 2025

Israel’s extensive destruction of Southern Lebanon

Amnesty International

@amnesty_international

Footnotes

[1] See section “Legal Framework” below.

^[2] Establishing precise definitions of the “tactical” and “strategic” levels of an armed conflict has been challenging for centuries. In general, actions conducted by small units, such as individual attacks and battles, are considered as belonging to the tactical level, while the strategic level concerns the overall national policy and theatre strategy. Andrew S. Harvey, “The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis,” Military Review, November – December 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-21/Harvey-Levels-of-War-1.pdf
Notably, both levels of an armed conflict may be considered when determining military necessity. Echoing a broadly held consensus, the United States Law of War Manual states: “Thus, military necessity may consider the broader imperatives of winning the war and not only the demands of the immediate situation.” Department of Defense Law of War Manual, updated July 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF, pg. 57.

[3] Israel Defence Forces, X post: “IDF Spokesperson RAdm. Daniel Hagari exposing Hezbollah’s way of firing missiles from civilian homes, and how the IDF plans on dismantling it” 23 September 2024, https://x.com/IDF/status/1838081162129940615

^[4] See ArcGIS Pro, ESRI, “Detect pixel value change”, https://pro.arcgis.com/en/pro-app/latest/help/analysis/image-analyst/pixel-value-change-detection.htm (accessed 10 July 2025).

^[5] See Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team, “Filling OSM buildings data gaps for recovery in Lebanon”, 7 January 2025, https://www.hotosm.org/updates/filling-osm-buildings-data-gaps-in-lebanon

[6] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “ACLED Codebook, 2025”, accessed 17 June 2025, www.acleddata.com

[7] Institute for the Study of War, “Iran Updates”, 17 October 2023, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-updates

[8] S/RES/1701(2006) Resolution 1701 (2006) / adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on 11 August 2006 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/581053?v=pdf

^[9] Amnesty International, “You feel like you are subhuman”: Israel’s genocide against Palestinians in Gaza (Index: MDE 15/8668/2024), 5 December 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/8668/2024/en, p. 56.

^[10] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (25 June 2025)”, 25 June 2025, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-25-june-2025

^[11] In December 2024, Amnesty International published a report in which it concluded that “Israel, through its policies, actions and omissions against Palestinians in Gaza following 7 October 2023, committed and is committing genocide”.

[12] Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Evidence of Israel’s unlawful use of white phosphorus in southern Lebanon as cross-border hostilities escalate” 31 October 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/lebanon-evidence-of-israels-unlawful-use-of-white-phosphorus-in-southern-lebanon-as-cross-border-hostilities-escalate; Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Deadly Israeli attack on journalists must be investigated as a war crime”, 7 December 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/lebanon-deadly-israeli-attack-on-journalists-must-be-investigated-as-a-war-crime; Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Establish international investigation into deadly attacks using exploding portable devices”, 20 September 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/09/lebanon-establish-international-investigation-into-deadly-attacks-using-exploding-portable-devices; Amnesty International, “Israel/Lebanon: Branches of Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution not military targets”, 22 October 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/10/israel-lebanon-branches-of-hezbollah-affiliated-financial-institution-not-military-targets; Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Israeli air strikes that killed at least 49 civilians further evidence of war crimes”, 12 December 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/lebanon-israeli-air-strikes-that-killed-at-least-49-civilians-further-evidence-of-war-crimes; Amnesty International, “Israel: Hezbollah’s use of inherently inaccurate weapons to launch unlawful attacks violates international law”, 20 December 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/israel-hezbollahs-use-of-inherently-inaccurate-weapons-to-launch-unlawful-attacks-violates-international-law; Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Israeli attacks on health facilities, ambulances and paramedics must be investigated as war crimes”, 5 March 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/lebanon-israeli-attacks-on-health-facilities-ambulances-and-paramedics-must-be-investigated-as-war-crimes

[13] ~~[MISSING SOURCE]~~ for deaths in Lebanon until December 2024 “4047 شهيدًا و16638 جريحًا الحصيلة الإجمالية المحدثة للعدوان الإسرائيلي”

[“4,047 martyrs and 16,638 wounded is the updated total toll of the Israeli aggression”]4 https://moph.gov.lb/ar/Media/view/77347/4047-شهيدًا-و16638-جريحًا-الحصيلة-الإجمالية-المحدثة-للعدوان-الإسرائيلي-
Reference for deaths in Lebanon since December 2024: Today, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1456787/series-of-violent-israeli-strikes-on-nabatieh-israeli-army-claims-hezbollah-members-targeted.html
Reference for deaths in Israel: https://www.timesofisrael.com/six-months-after-ceasefire-some-in-north-are-slow-to-recover-as-fears-of-new-fight-lurk

^[14] L’Orient Today, “Full text of the cease-fire agreement between Lebanon and Israel”, 26 November 2024. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1437074/full-text-of-the-cease-fire-agreement-between-lebanon-and-israel.html

^[15] MTC4L, “Lebanon: Italian-led Military Technical Commitee starts its first operational and training activities”, 30 August 2024, https://www.esercito.difesa.it/en/News/Pagine/Italian-led-Military_Technical_Commitee.aspx; L’Orient Today, “Who is in the cease-fire ‘monitoring committee’ and what does it do?”, 2 December 2024, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1437793/who-is-in-the-cease-fire-monitoring-committee-and-what-does-it-do.html; USCENTCOM, “MG Jasper Jeffers arrives in Beirut to Serve as Co-Chair for the Implementation and Monitoring Mechanism of the Cessation of Hostilities”, 29 November 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3981254/mg-jasper-jeffers-arrives-in-beirut-to-serve-as-co-chair-for-the-implementation

^[17] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: يان #عاجل إلى سكان #لبنان [“Urgent message to the people of #Lebanon”], 29 November 2024, https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1862363097601826888 (in Arabic).

^[18] OHCHR, “Israel must stop killing civilians returning to their homes in South Lebanon: UN experts”, 13 February 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/israel-must-stop-killing-civilians-returning-their-homes-south-lebanon-un

^[19] OHCHR, “Israel must stop killing civilians returning to their homes in South Lebanon” (previously cited).

^[20] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: #عاجل: لقد هزم #حزب_الله ومني بضربة قوية جدا وأعيد سنوات طويلة إلى الوراء [“#Urgent: #Hezbollah has been defeated and has suffered a very strong blow, setting it back many years”],18 February 2025, https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1891871556994728307

^[21] Alma Research and Education Center, “Israel Remains in Five Key Areas in Southern Lebanon as a Response to Potential Restoration of Hezbollah’s Attack Capabilities”, 18 February 2025, https://israel-alma.org/israel-remains-in-five-key-areas-in-southern-lebanon-as-a-response-to-potential-restoration-of-hezbollahs-attack-capabilities

^[22] France 24, “Israeli troops ‘staying indefinitely’ in Lebanon border buffer zone, defence minister says”, 27 February 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250227-israeli-troops-staying-indefinitely-in-lebanon-border-buffer-zone-defence-minister-says

[23] OHCHR, “Israeli operations in Lebanon continue to kill civilians”, 15 April 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/04/israeli-operations-lebanon-continue-kill-civilians

[24] Additional Protocol I, Article 49(1): “‘Attacks’ means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” See also ICRC, Commentary to Additional Protocol I, 1987, para. 1880: “the term ‘attack’ means ‘combat action’”. This definition of attacks also applies in non-international armed conflicts. See ICRC, Commentary to Additional Protocol II, 1987, para. 4783.

[25] Reference to “civilian objects” owes to the fact that this briefing focuses on destruction of property. These principles also apply to attack involving civilians and the civilian population.

[26] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 7.

[27] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 9.

[28] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 8.

[29] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 156.

[30] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 10.

[31] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, rule 14: “Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”

[32] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, rule 15: “In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”

[33] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rules 11-12, 14 and 156.

[34] ICRC, Commentary to Additional Protocol I, 1987, para. 1880; ICRC, Commentary to Additional Protocol II, 1987, para. 4783.

[35] ICRC, Customary IHL Study, rule 50. This rule derives from Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations IV, which enjoys customary status. See ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, para. 96.

[36] ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladic, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 22 November 2017, para. 3257. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 March 2003, para. 589; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Oric, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 30 June 2006, para. 588.

[37] J. Lovitky, Understanding the Distinction Between Property Destruction Governed by Hague Article 23(g) and the Rules Governing Attacks, Articles of War, 6 November 2024.

[38] ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 892.

[39] ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 892.

[40] ICC, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Trial Chamber IX, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 2776. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 892; O. Triffterer and K. Ambos, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, 2016, p. 568, para. 970.

[41] ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 891.

[42] Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), 24 April 1863.

[43] ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 17 December 2004, para. 686; ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 894. However, see also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 31 January 2005, para. 295, where “military necessity” was interpreted more narrowly by equating it to the definition of “military objectives” under IHL.

[44] ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 894. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Trial Chamber vi, Judgment, 8 July 2019, para. 1164.

[45] ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 893.

[46] ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Trial Chamber vi, Judgment, 8 July 2019, para. 1098.

[47] ICC, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Trial Chamber IX, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 2779.

[48] US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, The Krupp Trial, 1947–1948, United Nations War Crimes Commission Law Reports, Vol. X, p. 136: “[w]hat was intended merely [under Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations] was to authorize the seizure or destruction of private property only in exceptional cases when it was an imperative necessity for the conduct of military operations…”.

[49] US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, The Hostages case, Trial of Wilhem List and Others, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VIII, 1949, p. 66: “It is lawful to destroy railways, lines of communication or any other property that might be utilised by the enemy. Private homes and churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit of wanton devastation of a district or the wilful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for the sake of suffering alone.”

[50] ICTY, Prosecutor v. Oric, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 30 June 2006, para. 588.

[51] ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 17 December 2004, para. 575.

[52] Israel Defence Forces, X post: “IDF Spokesperson RAdm. Daniel Hagari exposing Hezbollah’s way of firing missiles from civilian homes, and how the IDF plans on dismantling it”, 23 September 2024, https://x.com/IDF/status/1838081162129940615

^[53] ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 156; K. Dörmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2003, p. 345.

^[54] Rome Statute, Articles 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii).

^[55] Rome Statute, Articles 12(3) and 13(b).

^[56]ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 896. In contrast see Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(iv)): “Extensive destruction and appropriation of property […] carried out unlawfully and wantonly” (emphasis added).

[57] ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 38.

[58] ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 40(A).

[59] Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Article 4.

[60] ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 39.

[61] ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 156; Rome Statute, Rome Statute, Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv).

[62] ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 150. See also Hague Convention IV, Article 3; Additional Protocol I, Article 91; Rome Statute, Article 75.

[63] Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted and proclaimed by UNGA Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, Principles 19-23.

^[64] Israel Defense Forces, X post: “IDF Spokesperson RAdm. Daniel Hagari exposing Hezbollah’s way of firing missiles from civilian homes, and how the IDF plans on dismantling it” (previously cited).

^[65] Israel Defense Forces, X post: “In accordance with the decision of the political echelon, a few hours ago, the IDF began limited, localized, and targeted ground raids based on precise intelligence against Hezbollah terrorist targets and infrastructure in southern Lebanon”, 1 October 2024, https://x.com/IDF/status/1840890054819864776

^[66] Interview by phone with Hussein Youssef, Deputy Mayor of Tyre Harfa, 21 March 2025.

[67] Shapefiles of areas of Israeli advances provided by Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project, on file with Amnesty International

^[68] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), From Crisis to Recovery: Local Authorities Confronting Post-War Realities in Lebanon, January 2025, www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2025-01/rapid_impact_assessment_report_of_union_of_mun_jan21.pdf

^[69] Civil Society Knowledge Centre, “Kfar Kila Village Profile”, December 2010, https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/vpr/kfarkilavillageprofile_revised1.pdf

[70] More destruction occurred before 26 September 2024, likely from air strikes – this destruction was not considered in this analysis.

[71] Based on Lebanese media reports reviewed by Amnesty International covering 29 demolition incidents between 2 October 2024 and 26 January 2025. Documentation of source material held on file by Amnesty International.

^[72]Nine Statements published on Hezbollah’s official Telegram channel between 2 October and 23 November 2024, available at:

https://t.me/mmirleb/7515; https://t.me/mmirleb/8003; https://t.me/mmirleb/8020; https://t.me/mmirleb/8070; https://t.me/mmirleb/8122; https://t.me/mmirleb/8398; https://t.me/mmirleb/8599; https://t.me/mmirleb/8770; https://t.me/mmirleb/8911

^[73] Institute for the Study of War, “Iran Updates”, 29 October 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024; IDF, הרמטכ”ל בכפר כילא: “נמשיך לתקוף בעומק ולפגוע בחיזבאללה מאוד קשה” [“The Chief of Staff in Kfar Kila: ‘We will continue to attack in depth and hit Hezbollah very hard’”], https://www.idf.il/249003 (in Hebrew); Doron Kadosh, X post: 2/ נקודה ראשונה בסיור – כפר כילא [“2/ First point on the tour – Kfar Qila…”], https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1868704095634436115 (in Hebrew).

^[74] Institute for the Study of War, “Iran Update (October 29, 2024)” (previously cited).

^[75] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: يان #عاجل إلى سكان #لبنان [“Urgent message to the people of #Lebanon”] (previously cited).

^[76] Women Journalists Without Chains, “Condemnation of Israeli Attacks on Lebanese Civilians and Journalists”, 30 January 2025, https://wjwc.org/news-en/condemnation-of-israeli-attacks-on-lebanese-civilians-and-journalists

^[77] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: #عاجل: في وقت سابق اليوم قامت قوات جيش الدفاع التي تعمل في منطقة جنوب لبنان بإطلاق النار بهدف إبعاد وازالة تهديدات في عدة مناطق تم رصد مشتبه فيهم يقتربون منها [“#Urgent: Earlier today, IDF forces operating in the southern Lebanon area opened fire to deter and remove threats in several areas where suspects were spotted approaching.”], 26 January 2025, https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1883472108165923009 (in Arabic).

^[78] Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, “Final Result of the Israeli Enemy’s Attacks Yesterday”, 27 January 2025, https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Media#/en/Media/view/77767/final-result-of-the-israeli-enemys-attacks-yesterday

^[79] IDF, כך נראית הפעילות בלבנון – ממצלמות הגוף של הלוחמים [“This is what the activity in Lebanon looks like – from the fighters’ body cameras”], 1 October 2024, https://www.idf.il/אתרי-יחידות/יומן-המלחמה/כל-הכתבות/הפצות/כך-נראית-הפעילות-בלבנון-ממצלמות-הגוף-של-הלוחמים; IDF, Telegram post: צה”ל חיסל מפקד פלוגה במרחב כפר כילא בארגון הטרור חיזבאללה, שהיה אחראי לירי הנ”ט לכפר יובל ממנו נהרגו ברק איילון ואמו מירה ז”ל [“The IDF eliminated a company commander in the Kfar Kila area of the Hezbollah terrorist organization, who was responsible for the anti-tank fire on the village of Yuval, from which Barak Ayalon and his mother Mira, the late, were killed.”], 6 October 2024, https://t.me/idf_telegram/12204

^[80] IDF, Telegram post: כוחות צה״ל משמידים את תשתיות הטרור של חיזבאללה בכפר כילא: חטיבה 769 איתרה והשמידה עשרות תשתיות תת-קרקעיות, מאות אמצעי לחימה, מסמכי אויב, משגרים וציוד של מחבלי יחידת ׳כוח רדואן’ [“IDF forces destroy Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure in the village of Qila: Brigade 769 located and destroyed dozens of underground infrastructure, hundreds of weapons, enemy documents, launchers and equipment belonging to terrorists from the ‘Radwan Force’ unit.”], 28 October 2024, https://t.me/idf_telegram/13166 (in Hebrew).

^[81] IDF updates, מיקומי תשתיות הטרור של חיזבאללה | את”צ [“Locations of Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure | IDF”, 14 November 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oeDRh_5qEo (in Hebrew).

^[82] IDF, בלב מרחב אזרחי בכפר כילא: תיעודים של תשתיות טרור, משגרים ואמל”ח של חיזבאללה בדרום לבנון [“In the Heart of Civilian Space in the Village of Qila: Documentation of Hezbollah’s Terror Infrastructure, Launchers, and Weapons in South Lebanon”], 14 November 2024, https://www.idf.il/אתרי-יחידות/יומן-המלחמה/כל-הכתבות/הפצות/תיעודים-של-תשתיות-טרור-משגרים-ואמל-ח-של-חיזבאללה-בדרום-לבנון

^[83] אבו עלי אקספרס [“Abu Ali Express”], video post on its Telegram channel: הלבנונים מתלוננים: צה”ל מנצל את הפסקת האש כדי להמשיך ולהרוס את הכפרים בדרום לבנון. [“The Lebanese complain: The IDF is taking advantage of the ceasefire to continue destroying villages in southern Lebanon.”], 29 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International, https://t.me/abualiexpress/82663 (in Hebrew).

^[84] Interview by phone, 6 April 2025.

[85] Interview by phone with Farrah Berrou, resident of Kfar Kila, 3 December 2024.

^[86] Interview by phone with Ali Yehya, resident of Kfar Kila, 28 March 2025

^[87] Video posted on Facebook by Ali Yehya on 21 March 2025, held on file by Amnesty International, https://www.facebook.com/reel/1695579094699091

^[88] IDF, בלב מרחב אזרחי בכפר כילא: תיעודים של תשתיות טרור, משגרים ואמל”ח של חיזבאללה בדרום לבנון [“In the Heart of Civilian Space in the Village of Qila: Documentation of Hezbollah’s Terror Infrastructure, Launchers, and Weapons in South Lebanon”], 14 November 2024, https://www.idf.il/אתרי-יחידות/יומן-המלחמה/כל-הכתבות/הפצות/תיעודים-של-תשתיות-טרור-משגרים-ואמל-ח-של-חיזבאללה-בדרום-לבנון

[89] ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 8; Additional protocol I, Article 52(2); ICRC, Commentary to Additional protocol I, 1987, paras 2024 and 2028: “destruction, capture or neutralization must offer a ‘definite military advantage’ in the circumstances ruling at the time. In other words, it is not legitimate to launch an attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages… In the case of Article 52 there must be a definite military advantage for every military objective that is attacked”. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 893.

[90] ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 22.

[91] ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 23.

^[92] Based on Lebanese media reports reviewed by Amnesty International covering 12 demolition incidents between 3 October and 29 December 2024. Documentation of source material held on file by Amnesty International.

^[93] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: #عاجل | بيان عاجل لسكان #جنوب_لبنان في القرى التالية [“#Urgent | Urgent statement to the residents of #South_Lebanon in the following villages”], 1 October 2024, https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1841045108537294975 (in Arabic).

^[94] Four posts by Hezbollah’s official channels on Telegram on 3, 4, 5 and 9 October 2024, respectively: https://t.me/mmirleb/7545, https://t.me/mmirleb/7590, https://t.me/C_Military1/61481; https://t.me/C_Military1/61415

^[95] Kann News, X post: תיעוד: רגעי הנפת דגל ישראל במארון א-ראס שבלבנון [“Documentation: Moments of the Israeli flag being raised in Maroun a-Ras, Lebanon”], 8 October 2024, https://x.com/kann_news/status/1843649920982757858 (in Hebrew).

^[96] IDF, אוגדה 36 ממשיכה לפעול בעוצמה בדרום לבנון. צפו בתיעודים [“Division 36 continues to operate vigorously in southern Lebanon. Watch the documentation”], 9 October 2024, https://www.idf.il/אתרי-יחידות/יומן-המלחמה/כל-הכתבות/הפצות/אוגדה-36-ממשיכה-לפעול-בעוצמה-בדרום-לבנון-צפו-בתיעודים (in Hebrew).

^[97] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: #عاجل بعد سبعة أيام من العملية الخاصة [“#Urgent Seven days after the special operation”], 10 November 2024, https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1855653521171132909 (in Arabic).

^[98] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: يان #عاجل إلى سكان #لبنان [“Urgent message to the people of #Lebanon”], 29 November 2024 (previously cited).

^[99] Channel Nabatieh, Telegram post: رشقات نارية كثيفة يطلقها جيش الإحتلال الإسرائيلي من مارون الراس بإتجاه بنت جبيل [“Heavy gunfire was fired by the Israeli occupation army from Maroun al-Ras towards Bint Jbeil”], 3 December 2024, https://t.me/channelnabatieh/107988

^[100] WJWC, “Condemnation of Israeli Attacks on Lebanese Civilians and Journalists” (previously cited).

^[101] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: #عاجل: في وقت سابق اليوم قامت قوات جيش الدفاع التي تعمل في منطقة جنوب لبنان بإطلاق النار بهدف إبعاد وازالة تهديدات في عدة مناطق تم رصد مشتبه فيهم يقتربون منها [“#Urgent: Earlier today, IDF forces operating in the southern Lebanon area opened fire to deter and remove threats in several areas where suspects were spotted approaching.”], 26 January 2025 (previously cited).

^[102] Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, “Final Result of the Israeli Enemy’s Attacks Yesterday” (previously cited).

^[103] Kann News, X post: תיעוד: רגעי הנפת דגל ישראל במארון א-ראס שבלבנון [“Documentation: Moments of the Israeli flag being raised in Maroun a-Ras, Lebanon”], 8 October 2024 (previously cited).

^[104] Saher_News_24_7, X post: השמדת פארק איראן ופסל קאסם סלימאני במרון אל-ראס – דרום לבנון על ידי כוחותינו שמתקדמים טוב מאוד בדרום לבנון [“The destruction of the Iran Park and the statue of Qassem Soleimani in Maron al-Ras – South Lebanon by our forces, who are making very good progress in South Lebanon.”], 9 October 2024, https://x.com/Saher_News_24_7/status/1843964835702374802; Itay Blumenthal, X post: תיעוד: לוחמי גדוד ההנדסה 605 בחטיבה 188 השמידו את פסלו של קאסם סולימני שהוצבה ב”טיילת איראן” במארון א-ראס בדרום לבנון [“Documentation: Fighters from the 605th Engineering Battalion in the 188th Brigade destroyed the statue of Qassem Soleimani that was placed on the “Iran Promenade” in Maroun a-Ras in southern Lebanon.”], 9 October 2024, https://x.com/ItayBlumental/status/1844124121548153215

^[105] The document included the logo of the Israeli military’s Education and Youth Corps program: IDF, חיל החינוך והנוער [“Education and Youth Corps”], accessed 17 June 2025, https://www.idf.il/אתרי-יחידות/חיל-החינוך-והנוער (in Hebrew).

^[106] IDF, כאן ועכשיו [“Here and Now”], 11 October 2024, https://www.idf.il/media/cnsomrhp/כאן-ועכשיו-דגל-ישראל-בטיילת-האיראנית-במארון-א-ראס.pdf

[107] Interview in person, 20 November 2024.

[108] IDF, כאן ועכשיו [“Here and Now”] (in Hebrew) (previously cited).

^[109] עדכוני צה”ל [“IDF Updates”], איטום התשתית התת קרקעית | את”צ [“Waterproofing the underground infrastructure | ATC”], 10 November 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mwfge7K6NYU (in Hebrew).

^[110] Based on Lebanese media reports reviewed by Amnesty International covering four demolition incidents between 2 October 2024 and 24 January 2025. Documentation of source material held on file by Amnesty International.

^[111] IDF, תיעוד ראשון של חטיבת הקומנדו והצנחנים בדרום לבנון [“First documentation of the Commando and Paratrooper Brigade in South Lebanon”], 2 October 2024, https://www.idf.il/235688 (in Hebrew).

^[112] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: يان #عاجل إلى سكان #لبنان [“Urgent message to the people of #Lebanon”], 29 November 2024 (previously cited).

^[113] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: #عاجل: في وقت سابق اليوم قامت قوات جيش الدفاع التي تعمل في منطقة جنوب لبنان بإطلاق النار بهدف إبعاد وازالة تهديدات في عدة مناطق تم رصد مشتبه فيهم يقتربون منها [“#Urgent: Earlier today, IDF forces operating in the southern Lebanon area opened fire to deter and remove threats in several areas where suspects were spotted approaching.”], 26 January 2025 (previously cited).

^[114]

Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, “Final Result of the Israeli Enemy’s Attacks Yesterday” (previously cited).

^[115] Amir Tsarfati, Telegram post: “All the ‘innocent’ homes of south Lebanese civilians that were discovered as terror bases of Hezbollah are being obliterated!”, 27 October 2024, https://t.me/beholdisraelchannel/43305; Ofer Inbar, X post: אבדנו חבר לנשק, פינינו פצועים, מצאנו אמלח בכמויות מטורפות, וכשחזרנו אתמול ארצה זה מה שקרה… [“We lost a comrade in arms, we evacuated the wounded, we found salt in crazy quantities, and when we returned to Israel yesterday, this is what happened…”], 27 October 2024, https://x.com/oferinbarpr/status/1850406828791804357 (in Hebrew).

^[116] Interview by phone with Lubnan Baalbaki, a civilian from Odeisseh, 5 December 2024.

^[117] Interview by phone with Lubnan Baalbaki, a civilian from Odeisseh, 28 April 2025.

^[118] Civil Society Knowledge Centre, “Aita Chaab Village Profile”, December 2010, https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/vpr/aitachaabvillageprofile.pdf

^[119] Based on Lebanese media reports reviewed by Amnesty International covering 14 demolition incidents between 13 October 2024 and 23 January 2025. Documentation of source material held on file by Amnesty International.

^[120] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: بيان عاجل إلى سكان #جنوب_لبنان [“Urgent statement to the residents of #South_Lebanon”], 12 October 2024, https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845026806874644945 (in Arabic).

^[121] Eight posts on Hezbollah’s official Telegram channel between 13 and 26 October 2024, available at: https://t.me/mmirleb/7861; https://t.me/mmirleb/7906; https://t.me/mmirleb/7961; https://t.me/mmirleb/8360; https://t.me/mmirleb/8067; https://t.me/mmirleb/8138; https://t.me/mmirleb/8173; https://t.me/mmirleb/8256https://t.me/mmirleb/8138; https://t.me/mmirleb/8173; https://t.me/mmirleb/8256

^[122] IDF, לוחמי גולני עצרו את מפקד מרחב עייתא א-שעב של חיזבאללה [“Golani fighters arrested the commander of Hezbollah’s Aita al-Shaab region”], 29 October 2024, https://www.idf.il/אתרי-יחידות/יומן-המלחמה/כל-הכתבות/הפצות/לוחמי-גולני-עצרו-את-מפקד-מרחב-עייתא-א-שעב-של-חיזבאללה (in Hebrew).

^[123] Aitaroun Media Platform, Telegram post: عاجل | اشتباكات بالأسلحة الرشاشة بين المقاومة وجنود العدو خلال الساعات الماضية على أطراف بلدة عيتا الشعب عند محاولة العدو التسلل الى الاراضي اللبنانية [“Urgent | Clashes with machine guns between the resistance and enemy soldiers over the past hours on the outskirts of the town of Aita al-Shaab as the enemy attempted to infiltrate Lebanese territory.”], 7 November 2024, https://t.me/Aitarounmediaplatform/56199; Aitaroun Media Platform, Telegram post: عاجل | الوكالة الوطنية : أطلق العدو فجراً نيران رشاشاته الثقيلة في اتجاه الاحراج المتاخمة لبلدات الناقورة وجبل اللبونة وعلما الشعب وطيرحرفا والضهيرة وعيتا الشعب [“Urgent | National News Agency: The enemy opened heavy machine gun fire at dawn in the direction of the forests adjacent to the towns of Naqoura, Jabal Labbouneh, Alma al-Shaab, Tayr Harfa, Dahyrieh and Aita al-Shaab.”], 11 November 2024, https://t.me/Aitarounmediaplatform/57103; Al-Akhbar News, العدو يواصل استهداف المعابر الحدودية مع سوريا [“The enemy continues to target border crossings with Syria.”], 6 December 2024, https://www.al-akhbar.com/lebanon/815189/العدو-يواصل-استهداف-المعابر-الحدودية-مع-سوريا ; Channel Nabatieh, Telegram post: اولي:
العدو استهدف بلدة عيتا الشعب بقذيفة مدفعية [“First: The enemy targeted the town of Aita al-Shaab with an artillery shell”], 26 December 2024, https://t.me/channelnabatieh/109989; Channel Nabatieh, Telegram post: تفجيرات إسرائيلية في الناقورة [“Israeli bombings in Naqoura”], 27 December 2024, https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110099

^[124] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: يان #عاجل إلى سكان #لبنان [“Urgent message to the people of #Lebanon”], 29 November 2024 (previously cited).

^[125] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: #عاجل: في وقت سابق اليوم قامت قوات جيش الدفاع التي تعمل في منطقة جنوب لبنان بإطلاق النار بهدف إبعاد وازالة تهديدات في عدة مناطق تم رصد مشتبه فيهم يقتربون منها [“#Urgent: Earlier today, IDF forces operating in the southern Lebanon area opened fire to deter and remove threats in several areas where suspects were spotted approaching.”], 26 January 2025 (previously cited).

^[126] Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, “Final Result of the Israeli Enemy’s Attacks Yesterday” (previously cited).

^[127] IDF, לוחמי גולני עצרו את מפקד מרחב עייתא א-שעב של חיזבאללה [“Golani fighters arrested the commander of Hezbollah’s Aita al-Shaab region”] (previously cited).

^[128] Video published on Instagram on 23 October 2024 on an Israeli soldier’s private account, on file with Amnesty International.

^[129] עמית סגל [Amit Segal], video posted to Telegram, 22 October 2024, https://t.me/amitsegal/39118

^[130] Interview by phone with Muhammad Srour, Mayor of Aita Ash-Shaab, 21 March 2025.

[131] ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 8: Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2).

[132] ICRC, Commentary to Additional protocol I, 1987, paras 2024 and 2028; ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 893: “‘military advantage’… must be definite and cannot in any way be indeterminate or potential”.

^[133] Amit Segal, Telegram post: “The explosion of an entire village in Lebanon that was a gathering place for terrorists”], 30 October 2024, https://t.me/amitseg/1041; Amit Segal, Telegram post: “Another angle to the crazy explosion”, 30 October 2024, https://t.me/amitseg/1043; MarioLeb79, X post: “BirdsEye View Matmoura Dhayra Village”, 30 October 2024, https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1851667756468310379

^[134] Based on Lebanese media reports reviewed by Amnesty International covering 5 demolition incidents between 27 October and 26 January 2025. Documentation of source material held on file by Amnesty International.

^[135] Amit Segal, Telegram post: “On October 9, 2023, a terrorist squad from the village of A-Dahria in Lebanon infiltrated Israel.”, 13 October 2024,
https://t.me/amitseg/518

^[136] Times of Israel, “IDF says it is unaware of incident in which UNIFIL claims troops fired at post”, 25 October 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-is-unaware-of-incident-in-which-unifil-claims-troops-fired-at-post

^[137] الإعلام الحربي – التغطية الإخبارية [“War Media – News Coverage” – Hezbollah], Telegram post: دعماً لشعبنا الفلسطيني الصامد في قطاع غزة وإسناداً لمقاومته الباسلة ‌‏‌‏‌والشريفة، ودفاعًا عن لبنان ‏وشعبه، استهدف مجاهدو المقاومة الإسلامية عند الساعة 07:40 من مساء يوم الاربعاء 23-10-‌‏2024، تجمعًا لجنود وآليات العدو الإسرائيلي عند اطراف بلدة الظهيرة بصلية صاروخية. [“In support of our steadfast Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, in support of their valiant and honorable resistance, and in defense of Lebanon and its people, the Islamic Resistance fighters targeted, at 7:40 pm on Wednesday, October 23, 2024, a gathering of Israeli enemy soldiers and vehicles on the outskirts of the town of Al-Dhuhra with a rocket salvo.”], 23 October 2024, https://t.me/C_Military1/63597 (in Arabic) ; الإعلام الحربي في المقاومة الإسلامية [“War media in the Islamic Resistance” – Hezbollah], Telegram post: دعماً لشعبنا الفلسطيني الصامد في قطاع غزة وإسناداً لمقاومته الباسلة ‌‏‌‏‌والشريفة، ودفاعًا عن لبنان ‏وشعبه، استهدف مجاهدو المقاومة الإسلامية عند الساعة 04:20 من بعد ظهر يوم الأحد 27-10-2024 تجمعًا لجنود العدو الإسرائيلي جنوبي بلدة الضهيرة بصلية صاروخية. [“In support of our steadfast Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, in support of their valiant and honorable resistance, and in defense of Lebanon and its people, the Islamic Resistance fighters targeted, at 4:20 PM on Sunday 10/27/2024, a gathering of Israeli enemy soldiers south of the town of Al-Dhuhayrah with a rocket salvo.”], 27 October 2024, https://t.me/mmirleb/8411 (in Arabic).

^[138] Avichay Adraee, IDF’s Spokesperson for the Arab Media, X post: يان #عاجل إلى سكان #لبنان [“Urgent message to the people of #Lebanon”], 29 November 2024 (previously cited).

^[139] Annahar, الجيش اللبناني يدخل 18 بلدة جنوبية وتبقى 14 أخرى محتلة… ما هي؟ [“The Lebanese army enters 18 southern towns, while 14 others remain occupied… What are they?”], 26 January 2025, https://www.annahar.com/Lebanon/Politics/190450/الجيش-اللبناني-يدخل-18-بلدة-جنوبية-وتبقى-14-أخرى-محتلة-ما-هي

^[140] YINONEWS, Telegram post: עד הסוף! קרדיט: מתן תעסן וחטיבה 646 [“Until the end! Credit: Matan Taasen and Brigade 646”], 24 October 2024, https://t.me/yinonews/27080 (in Hebrew); Amit Segal, Telegram post: פיצוץ מסגד ותשתיות טרור [“Mosque bombing and terrorist infrastructure”], 1 November 2024, https://t.me/amitsegal/39465 (in Hebrew).

^[141] YINONEWS, Telegram post: עד הסוף! קרדיט: מתן תעסן וחטיבה 646 [“Until the end! Credit: Matan Taasen and Brigade 646”] (previously cited).

^[142] Interview by phone with Adiba Finsh, Dhayra civilian resident, 25 March 2025.

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