In a job listing posted in July 2025, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has advertised senior roles in its Communications Data Unit and Surveillance Operations team. In short, part of the role will be the covert monitoring of benefit claimants suspected of fraud. While the listing describes these roles as targeting “serious organised fraud,” let’s not beat around the bush: the DWP is recruiting people to spy on disabled and non-working people.
Hidden in plain sight: DWP snooping dressed up as fraud control
The Canary’s Rachel Charlton-Dailey previously reported for the Big Issue in 2024 that the DWP was recruiting covert surveillance officers to “snoop on benefit claimants” as part of its fraud-crackdown efforts. One job advert notes that the department “utilises covert surveillance to gather evidence to prove/disprove offences,” although often without clarity on what constitutes an “offence”.
At the time, the DWP denied that the roles were specifically for snooping on benefit claimants – but alluded to the fact they were part of organised crime roles. However, that was a laughable excuse at the time. And the new job listing shows it was nonsense.
Such language shows that surveillance is no longer confined to a small number of high‑risk investigations—but is institutionalised as standard procedure.
In parallel, the government is pushing to legislate for DWP access to claimants’ bank accounts under the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill. This would allow banks to share transaction data and allow the government to recover overpayments directly, without a court order. Privacy groups argue this is tantamount to mass surveillance, with algorithms scanning the finances of claimants—often without any suspicion of wrongdoing.
Labour MP Neil Duncan‑Jordan warns this amounts to presuming guilt: “welfare recipients would be treated as suspects… millions are being monitored” and could face wrongful investigations, especially among disabled people, carers and pensioners.
AI bias and false positives: a flawed system
Even the algorithmic tools used by the DWP have proven unreliable. Data obtained under freedom of information revealed that around 200,000 housing benefit claims had been falsely flagged by DWP’s fraud-detection AI over three years—with two-thirds of those flagged claims later found legitimate. In total, £4.4 million was spent on unnecessary investigations. Moreover, as the Canary previously reported, the AI is systemically racist and ageist – something the DWP has failed to properly address.
Privacy International and other groups have previously documented that the DWP uses physical surveillance, data from airlines, supermarkets, PayPal, bingo clubs and more to investigate claimants—turning ordinary consumer data into evidence, often without claimant consent.
Over forty organisations—including Disability Rights UK, Big Brother Watch, Child Poverty Action Group, Mind and Age UK—have condemned the DWP surveillance plans. They warn of risks echoing the Post Office Horizon scandal—where innocent people were wrongly accused and severely punished due to systemic and hidden algorithmic errors.
Repeated Carer’s Allowance scandals demonstrate that the DWP has long had access to relevant real‑time data, implying that much of this surveillance is redundant and punitive rather than necessary.
Institutionalised snooping from the DWP
The newly advertised DWP roles—such as “Senior Leader – Communications Data Unit” and “Safe Interactions Risk Manager”—lay out responsibilities for leading surveillance operations, performance monitoring, and strategy on covert investigative deployments. These are not temporary or narrowly scoped roles—they suggest a long‑term commitment to surveillance embedded in fraud enforcement infrastructure.
The DWP is literally treating benefit claimants as default suspects. It removes safeguards: many claimants feel unable to appeal or challenge systems that flag them. The presumption of innocence, a central tenet of British justice, is sidelined by algorithms and opaque procedures that do not inform individuals until sanctions hit.
Moreover, cross‑referencing bank data and everyday consumer transactions without suspicion may violate data protection rights and conflict with banks’ obligations to safeguard vulnerable customers.
The DWP’s new recruitment drive signals a troubling expansion of surveillance infrastructure within the welfare system. Far from supporting claimants, it entangles them in a presumption‑heavy, technocratic regime—where mistakes result in financial and emotional distress, and data is wielded without transparency or consent.
If the welfare state is expected to be compassionate, it cannot treat privacy as expendable. Surveillance cannot replace support; suspicion cannot substitute for solidarity. Of course, though, the DWP is not designed to function like this – and the physical, mental, financial, and emotional distress of claimants is built into this horrific system.
Featured image via the Canary
